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Abstract
Policy-specific actor-constellations consisting of party- and group-representatives commonly drive the effective establish-
ment of new policy programmes or changes in existing policies. In the EU multi-level system, the creation of such constel-
lations is complicated because it practically requires consensus on two dimensions: the European public policy at stake
and the issue of European integration. This means that, for interest groups with interests in particular policy domains, and
with limited interest in the actual issue of European integration, non-Eurosceptic parties must be their main ally in their
policy battles. We hypothesise that interest groups with relevant European domain-specific interests will ally with non-
Eurosceptic parties, whereas interest groups whose interests are hardly affected by the European policy process will have
party-political allies across the full range of positions on European integration. We assess this argument on the basis of an
elite-survey of interest group leaders and study group-party dyads in several European countries (i.e., Belgium, Lithuania,
Italy, Netherlands, Poland, and Slovenia) in a large number of policy domains. Our dependent variable is the group-party
dyad and the main independent variables are the European policy interests of the group and the level of Euroscepticism
of the party. We broadly find support for our hypotheses. The findings of our study speak to the debate concerning the
implications of the politicisation of European integration and, more specifically, the way in which party-political polarisa-
tion of Europe may divide domestic interest group systems and potentially drive group and party systems apart.
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1. Introduction
There was a time in which EU decisions could be safely
explained on the basis of intra-institutional bargain-
ing between ministries and among the EU institutions.
Multi-layered institutional complexity isolated the poli-
tics among these actors in such a way that they ‘seem
to deal first of all with each other and not with the de-
mand side of politics, be that the interest groups or the
European electorate’ (Pappi & Henning, 1999, p. 279).
Contemporary scholarship, however, does not assume
or observe the full insulation of bureaucratic, narrowly
scoped policymaking networks. It is far more sensitive
to the circumstances that lead policymakers to be ‘re-
sponsive’ to political pressures in terms of public opin-
ion, party politics, or interest groups (e.g., de Bruycker,
2017, 2019; Judge& Thomson, 2019; Rasmussen, Carroll,
& Lowery, 2014; Rauh, 2019; Schneider, 2018). In ad-
dition, research interests not only relate to the poten-
tial implications of the broader saliency of policy issues
on the EU agenda (e.g., Beyers, Dür, & Wonka, 2018;
Hanegraaff & Berkhout, 2018) but also addresses the
politicisation of the EU as a system or European integra-
tion as a process (e.g., de Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke,
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2016; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019), most dramatically observed
in contemporary British politics (de Vries, 2018a; Hobolt,
2016). The latter studies indicate a substantial reconfigu-
ration of several party systems in Western Europe, with
anti-EU positions featuring heavily on the ‘new’ cleavage
(e.g., Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, &
Edwards, 2006) and at least some sensitivity to contex-
tual, ‘demand-side,’ political factors within narrow, pub-
lic policy niches (e.g., Klüver, Braun, & Beyers, 2015).
These circumstances merit a broad conception of EU
multi-level politics as taking place in both domestic and
European political arenas, affecting a broad range of pol-
icy topics and including various types of political actors
and their relationships.
The more specific question central to this article is
the extent to which opposing party-political views on
European integration also affect the patterns of contacts
between interest groups and legislative policymakers in
domestic politics. Are EU positions a divisive (or decisive)
factor in party-interest group contacts, in which interest
groups avoid anti-EU parties? Or do interest groups align
mostly with their closest, policy area-specific party al-
lies regardless of their EU positions? The answer to this
issue may indicate that EU-related party-political cleav-
ages, and their broader salience in contemporary public
and political debate, do not spill-over into policy-specific
relationships with interest groups. Previous studies indi-
cate that policy-specific elite actor constellations consist-
ing of party- and group-representatives drive the effec-
tive establishment of newpolicy programmes or changes
in existing policies (e.g., Grossmann, 2014). In the EU
multi-level system, the creation of such constellations
is complicated because it practically requires consensus
on two dimensions: the European public policy at stake
and the issue of European integration (e.g., de Vries,
2018b). In theoretical terms, this is a ‘conflict of con-
flicts’ within which actors have to decide ‘which battle
do we want most to win?’ (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 65).
We argue that interest groups will always stay close to
their policy-specific interests rather than the broader is-
sue of European integration. For interest groups with in-
terests in particular policy domains, and with limited in-
terest in the actual issue of European integration, this
means that parties with favourable or moderate views
on European integration must be their principal allies in
policy battles. We hypothesise that interest groups with
relevant European domain-specific interestswill allywith
parties that have favourable views on the European in-
tegration process, whereas interest groups whose policy
interests are domestic in nature will have party-political
allies across the full range of party-political positions on
European integration.
Our article contributes to several debates. First, by
focussing on the importance of EU positions of parties
and interest groups, we start bridging the studies on
(national) party system dimensionality, interest group
networking, and (EU) public policy decisions. This re-
search integration, in the longer term, potentially im-
proves our understanding of the outcomes of national
and EU public policy and facilitates the normative evalua-
tion of those outcomes. Second, we theoretically further
develop issue-specific explanations for party-group con-
tacts (e.g., Berkhout, Hanegraaff, & Statsch, 2019). We
argue that party-group contact is importantly shaped by
the particular constellation of actors within (multi-level)
policy fields in combination with the longer term, dimen-
sional structuration of political conflict in the party sys-
tem. More specifically, we assess what happens when
party-political conflict on European integration crosscuts
the (potential) group-party relations in multi-level or do-
mestic policy areas.
The article is structured as follows. We first proceed
with a further specification of our hypothesis and its re-
lation to the ‘standard model’ of party-group ties. We
subsequently present our analysis on the basis of the
Comparative Interest Group (CIG) Survey of leaders of in-
terest groups in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Slovenia,
and Lithuania.We estimate logistic regressionmodels on
a large number of party-group dyads to test our hypothe-
ses. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and
provide a pathway for future research.
2. Theory: The ‘Conflict of Conflicts’ and the Standard
Model
Why do interest groups and parties interact with each
other? We conceive of political parties and interest
groups as policy-oriented organisations; parties attempt
to influence public policy by means of winning elec-
tions and interest groups do so without aspiration to
hold elected office (Bawn et al., 2012; Burstein, 1998;
Farrer, 2014; Fraussen & Halpin, 2018; Jordan, Halpin, &
Maloney, 2004). These conceptions heavily emphasise
the shaping of the political agenda and policy decision-
making rather than the electoral connection of parties or
themembership base of interest groups. This implies that
the relationship between these actors is largely observed
in the concrete political battles on issues related to the
operation of government. This conceptually (though not
necessarily empirically) differs somewhat from studies
of the organisational ties of interest groups and political
parties (e.g., Allern et al., 2019). Through these political
conflicts, in other words, parties and interest groups or-
ganise issues into politics and do so in a manner that re-
duces or enhances the issue-specific contacts between
certain types of political parties and interest groups. This
leads political parties and interest groups to be organised
around relatively similar conflicts, attend to similar issues
and have patterns of contact that follow from their issue-
priorities and positions. We find this argument in theo-
ries of political conflict (parties are stronger) and of the
policy process (issues are contagious).
Theories of political conflict posit that political par-
ties are stronger than other actors and the party sys-
tem agenda dominates all others. This is so because only
representatives of political parties actually govern and
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will, from that position, outperform others in ‘structur-
ing the world so you can win’ (Riker, 1996, p. 9). This,
as theorised by Schattschneider (1960, pp. 64–65), leads
to a displacement of smaller conflicts in such a man-
ner that ‘every major conflict [among political parties]
overwhelms, subordinates, and blots out a multitude of
lesser ones [among other actors].’ This ‘contagiousness’
of party-political differences onmajor dimensions of con-
flict such as European integration, must therefore affect
‘small’ conflict on particular policies. Political parties also
‘freeze’ conflict in the party system, subjecting histori-
cally established political oppositions and collaborations
within and between parties to strong inertia (e.g., Mair,
1997). The ideological underpinnings of these cleavages
guarantee a relatively strong organisational integration
of the different agendas (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Most
notably, this is the case for social democratic parties
and trade unions (e.g., Allern & Bale, 2012). The nature
of the party system also produces strong strategic in-
centives to avoid issues that may divide a government
coalition or parties internally (e.g., Hobolt & de Vries,
2015; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009). This, in turn,
leads to a ‘closed’ political opportunity structure that ne-
cessitates interest groups align themselves with party-
political friends (Beyers, de Bruycker, & Baller, 2015; Hall
& Deardorff, 2006).
In more policy-related terms, a similarity in political
focus may arise from parties and organised interests si-
multaneously working on the same political issues, or
all being part of the same political ‘bandwagon’ (e.g.,
Baumgartner & Leech, 2001). Relatively central political
actors provide ‘cues’ on their issue priorities and, similar
to a herd of sheep, followeach other in distinct policy bat-
tles (Halpin, 2011). This provides opportunities for move-
ments to successfully bargain over political resources
with elite allies (e.g., Burstein, Einwohner, & Hollander,
1995; Císař & Vráblíková, 2019), or for groups to influ-
ence the agenda of political parties (Klüver, 2018). These
mechanisms facilitate the ‘contagion’ of one issue with
others and connect smaller policy oppositions to larger
dimensions of (party-political) conflicts.
These arguments lead us to expect that the opposi-
tions among political parties are replicated on any minor
policy issue that may arise in the day-to-day business of
government. Any change in the dominant dimension of
conflict among political parties therefore must have im-
plications for the infinite issues that potentially appear
in the narrow venues of (multi-level) policymaking. As
suggested in the introduction, such a change in the di-
mensionality of party politics seems currently on-going:
Socio-cultural issues such as immigration and European
integration have partially displaced socio-economic ones
such as labour market policy and financial regulation in
the composition of themain dimension of conflict in con-
temporary European party politics (e.g., de Vries, 2018b;
de Vries, Hakhverdian, & Lancee, 2013; Hoeglinger, 2016;
Hutter & Kriesi, 2019; Marks et al., 2006; Szczerbiak &
Taggart, 2008; van Elsas & van der Brug, 2015). Left- and
right-wing Eurosceptic parties dynamically and strategi-
cally connect to the distinct core issues on the agen-
das of European party systems (e.g., Braun, Popa, &
Schmitt, 2019; Meijers & Rauh, 2016). We are dealing
with party-based Euroscepticism that occurs when a po-
litical party expresses ‘the idea of contingent or quali-
fied opposition, as well as incorporating outright and un-
qualified opposition to the process of European integra-
tion’ (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008; Taggart, 1998, p. 360).
Several policy crises also seem to have produced a fertile
ground for challenger parties to combine populism with
anti-European integration positions, as noted by Pirro,
Taggart, and van Kessel (2018, p. 388), ‘the cocktail of
anti-establishment populist parties with the increasing
politicisation of European integration as an issue in do-
mestic polities is an unmistakably powerful one.’
Given this change, we should observe that inter-
est groups with long-term policy-specific priorities avoid
parties voicing concerns on ‘new’ issues, most notably
European integration, that crosscut their prime policy
objectives. For instance, an environmental NGO may es-
chew a social democratic party which expresses an anti-
EU sentiment as this may hurt their policy objective
in the long term even if the party does express a pro-
environmental position. The same applies to business as-
sociations. If their membership profits significantly from
EU trade, such associations may exclude right-wing eco-
nomic parties which express strong anti-EU positions.
The benefit they may gain from any economic alignment
on national politics may be surpassed by the effects of
the anti-EUmessage of the party. This tension should be-
come particularly pronounced in policy communities ac-
tive in areas with strong EU policy competence and may
subsequently affect contact between interest groups and
parties (e.g., Rasmussen, 2012; Wonka, 2017). In less ab-
stract terms, interest groups for whom relevant policy
issues are addressed at the EU level, or in a multi-level
fashion, will not have much contact with Eurosceptic
parties because it makes their multi-level policy involve-
ment difficult.
All this leads to the following hypothesis. First, we
expect that interest groups for whom policies originat-
ing from the EU are of distinct importance, tend to pri-
oritise contact with parties with a pro-EU position com-
pared to other parties. Second, interest groups whose
policy interests are predominantly domestic in nature
maintain contacts with parties regardless of their posi-
tion on European integration. In sum:
H1: The more interest groups are affected by poli-
cies originating at the EU level, the more likely it is
that they have contacts with political parties with rel-
atively favourable views on European integration;
H2: If interest groups are mostly affected by policies
originating at the national level, views on European in-
tegration by political parties do not affect the contacts
between interest groups and parties.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 61–71 63
We control for what we label the ‘standard model’
for party-group contact (e.g., Berkhout et al., 2019).
This ‘model’ is the result of a wave of recent studies
on policy-specific contacts and long-term organisational
exchange-relationships between political parties and in-
terest groups (Allern & Bale, 2012; Allern et al., 2019;
Beyers et al., 2015; Bolleyer, 2017; de Bruycker, 2016;
Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017; Rasmussen & Lindeboom,
2013). To begin, interest groups are attracted to power
and particularly aim to interact with parties or legisla-
tors that have the capabilities to influence the direction
of public policy. This concerns both legislative and execu-
tive power (we expect the latter to be particularly attrac-
tive, given the relation to the bureaucracy). Furthermore,
parties and groups whose political positions are close to
each other are commonly found to have more frequent
policy-specific contacts, as well as structural organisa-
tional relations (Allern et al., 2019). Finally, representa-
tives of political parties are likely to appreciate interest
groups capable of delivering relevant policy information
across a diverse range of topics.
3. Data and Research Design
We use the CIG survey data (Beyers et al., 2016). In this
project, national interest group populations were sur-
veyed in Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and
Slovenia. Translated versions of the same online ques-
tionnaire were used to elicit answers concerning organ-
isational characteristics, political activities, and strate-
gies. Our dataset contains information on 2,067 inter-
est groups and their interactions with the most rele-
vant national parties (n = 38) in 2017 and 2018 (for
more information on the details of the survey see
www.cigsurvey.eu). Please note that more countries are
included in this project,most notably Sweden.We do not
include the Swedish data because several of the ques-
tions that we rely upon in our study were not asked.
The countries included span Western (the Netherlands,
Belgium), Eastern (Lithuania and Slovenia), and Southern
Europe (Italy), and differ substantially in their institu-
tional histories of state-society relations and the par-
ticular development of their party and interest-group
systems. More particularly, these countries differ sub-
stantially in the extent to which European integration
is a salient and polarised issue in party politics (see
SupplementaryMaterial for EU positions and salience for
all parties included in the analyses). This diversity cre-
ates relatively high generalisability of our findings, par-
ticularly within the European context.
We reshaped our interest group-level data into a
dataset in which group-party dyads (n = 16,514) form
the unit of analysis (Hanegraaff & Pritoni, 2019). This
dyadic data structure matches the relational nature of
our explanandum (group-party contact) and allows us
to simultaneously include interest group and party ex-
planatory factors in a single model, most notably, inter-
est groups’ interest in policies originating from the EU
and parties’ positions towards European integration. In
this dyadic data structure, our observations are clustered
by groups and parties, and we therefore estimate all our
models in a multi-level way with group- and party-level
random intercepts.
As for our dependent variable, the CIG survey asks in-
terest group representatives to indicate the frequency of
contact between their organisation and relevant national
legislative political parties over the previous 12 months.
Respondents were presented with a list of parties and
could indicate the frequency of their contacts on a five-
point scale (‘never’ to ‘at least once aweek’).We recoded
this variable into a dummy variable to indicate whether a
group and a party had none (0) or any (1) contact. This
binary contact indicator forms the dependent variable
of our analyses and we estimate logistic regression mod-
els accordingly. This question covers contact on any type
of issue; it may be about particular EU-related develop-
ments but in most cases is likely to refer to domestic leg-
islative politics. This is a valid measure because we would
like to knowwhether party-political pro- or anti-European
integration positions affect interest group-party contact,
and, given conflict contagiousness, whether it is plausible
to affect any contact, rather than only those pertaining to
EU policies or only those between EU actors.
Overall, 62% of the interest groups in our sample in-
dicated that they had any contact with political parties
over the previous 12 months. At the group-party dyad
level, contact was established in 41% of the logically pos-
sible cases. These patterns of interaction are comparable
with levels of contact with the national government (con-
tacted by 64% of the groups), but much higher than con-
tact with European institutions (European Commission:
21%; European Parliament: 29%). The 38% of the respon-
dents without any party-political contact tend to be ‘la-
tent’ groups whose political interests are only sporad-
ically triggered by particular social or political ‘distur-
bances’ (Truman, 1951) rather than a structural feature
of the organisation (as is indicated by the strong corre-
lation between party contacts and government contacts:
Spearman’s 𝜌 = .6; p < .001).
Our central independent variables are group-, party-,
and dyad-specific. To begin with the group level, we
measured interest groups’ interests in EU public policies
based on the responses to the survey question: ‘Policies
originating from the European Union have a different
level of importance for different organisations. How im-
portant are these policies for your organisation?’ (Beyers
et al., 2016). Respondents could answer on a 4-point
scale ranging from 1 = ‘EU policies are of no importance
whatsoever’ to 4 = ‘EU policies are the most important
focus.’We combine the ‘important’ and ‘most important’
answer categories, since only 2% of our respondents
used the highest category.
We derive the position on European integration of
political parties from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey
(CHES; Polk et al., 2017). The variable EU position ranges
from strongly opposed to European integration (1) to
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strongly in favour of European integration (7). We assess
our central hypothesis on the basis of an interaction term
of our measures of groups’ interests in EU public policy
and parties’ stance on the issue of European integration.
Patterns of contact between interest groups and par-
ties are affected by many factors other than just the
configuration of groups’ and parties’ interests related
to Europe. We therefore control for an extensive list of
potentially confounding factors, labelled ‘the standard
model’ above. Concerning the interest group sidewe rely
on the CIG survey to measure group resources (logged
number of staff) and the breadth of a group’s policy en-
gagement (number of policy fields active in). These fac-
tors increase the likelihood of contact with political par-
ties across the board. That is, staff resources enable in-
terest groups to contact many parties and the breadth
of a group’s policy engagement signifies its overall inter-
est in public policy. Our interest group survey includes
questions that tap into similar or adjacent characteris-
tics. However, to avoidmulticollinearity between our fac-
tors we do not include these in the model. There are a
small number of respondents whose central cause is di-
rectly related to supporting or rejecting the process of
European integration, such as the country chapters of
the European Movement International. We also control
for different group types (adapted from the INTERARENA
coding scheme, www.interarena.dk).
Regarding the party side, we control for the salience
of the topic of European integration to disentangle the
effects of positions and salience, based on CHES data
(Polk et al., 2017). To account for interest groups’ in-
clination to contact powerful parties, we include, first,
the legislative seat share (in percentage points) that a
given party held after the most recent election before
the CIG survey was set out. Second, we indicate gov-
ernment coalition participation during the time of the
survey and, last, party institutionalisation (logged age;
based on Döring & Manow, 2018). Interest groups may
prefer to interact with ideologically moderate parties in
order to avoid dissensus among their (potential) mem-
bers (e.g., Lowery & Gray, 2004, pp. 10–11; Salisbury,
1969). We therefore include measures of the ideological
positions of parties along the general left–right (based on
Volkens et al., 2017), and green-alternative-libertarian
(GAL)–traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) dimen-
sions (Polk et al., 2017), as well as their squared transfor-
mations. We also control for populist parties, which are
less likely to be contacted by interest groups (Berkhout
et al., 2019). Lastly, we include country dummies (fixed
effects) to account for the different baseline probabilities
of contact in our five countries of observation. Table 1
provides the summary statistics of all variables used for
the 16,514 dyads included in our analyses.
Table 1. Summary statistics.
mean s.d. min max
DV: Contact 0.41 0 1
Independent variables
IG interest in EU public policies:
no importance whatsoever 0.18 0 1
less important .46 0 1
important/most important 0.35 0 1
EU position 5.12 1.68 1.09 6.82
Party-level controls
EU salience 5.23 1.73 2.87 8.86
Left–Right position 4.91 0.88 2.55 6.97
GAL–TAN position 4.92 2.63 1 9.44
Seat share 10.86 9.27 0 47.30
Government 0.35 0 1
Populist 0.17 0 1
Institutionalisation (Party age logged) 3.25 0.66 1.39 4.58
IG-level controls
Breadth of policy engagement 3.27 3.35 0 22
Resources (#Staff logged) 1.08 1.38 0 8.99
Group Type:
Business group .44 0 1
Citizen group .31 0 1
Institutional group .06 0 1
Union .04 0 1
Other .14 0 1
Notes: N Dyads: 16,514; N Groups: 2,067; N Parties: 38.
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4. Analysis
Table 2 presents two logistic regression models testing
our expectation regarding the interactive effects of in-
terest groups’ interests in European policies and par-
ties’ positions towards the EU on the likelihood of con-
tact between groups and parties. In Model 1, we analy-
se the effects that each of these two variables have
without explicitly including an interaction term between
them. In logistic regression models, interactions be-
tween two variables may be present even in the absence
of an interaction term in the model (Berry, DeMeritt, &
Esarey, 2010). The model demonstrates that both inter-
est groups’ European policy interests and party EU posi-
tionsmatter for the likelihood of contact between groups
and parties. Importantly, both of these effects are quite
substantial: Keeping all other covariates constant at their
mean or their reference value (for categorical variables),
the model predicts groups for whom policies originating
at the EU level are (the most) important to be 25 per-
Table 2.Mixed effects logistic regression explaining contact between interest groups and political parties.
DV: Contact
(1) (2)
IGinterest in EU public policy
no importance whatsoever Ref. Ref.
less important .34 (.27) −.37 (.44)
important/most important 1.15 *** (.29) .36 (.46)
Party EU position .18 * (.11) .04 (.12)
Interaction effects
European policy less important for IG *Party EU position .18 *** (.06)
European policy (most) important for IG *Party EU position .19 *** (.07)
Control variables
EU salience .17 * (.09) .18 ** (.09)
Left–Right position .32 (.89) .32 (.89)
Left–Right position 2 −.01 (.09) −.02 (.09)
GAL–TAN position .45 *** (.17) .44 ** (.17)
GAL–TAN position 2 −.06 *** (.02) −.06 *** (.02)
Seat share .05 *** (.01) .05 *** (.01)
Government .10 (.27) .13 (.27)
Populist −.13 (.35) −.14 (.36)
Institutionalisation (Party age logged) .79 *** (.15) .82 *** (.15)
Breadth of policy engagement .20 *** (.03) .20 *** (.03)
Resources .64 *** (.08) .63 *** (.08)
Group type
Other group Ref. Ref.
Business group .80 *** (.29) .81 *** (.30)
Citizen group .94 *** (.31) .95 *** (.31)
Institutional group 1.80 *** (.47) 1.79 *** (.48)
Union 2.11 *** (.48) 2.31 *** (.48)
Country fixed effects
Belgium Ref. Ref.
Netherlands 1.16 *** (.40) 1.17 *** (.40)
Lithuania −.92 * (.48) −.96 ** (.49)
Slovenia −2.40 *** (.57) −2.49 *** (.57)
Italy .32 (.57) .36 (.57)
Intercept −10.33 *** (2.15) −9.78 *** (2.17)
Group intercept variance 12.93 13.16
Party intercept variance .20 .20
N Dyads 16,514 16,514
N Groups 2,067 2,067
N Parties 38 38
Log likelihood −6,606.05 −6,601.29
Notes: Entries are logit coefficients; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; standard errors in parentheses.
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centage points more likely to contact a given party than
groups for whom EU policy is not important. Likewise,
parties who are strongly opposed to European integra-
tion are 15 percentage points less likely to have contact
with a given interest group than parties who are strongly
in favour of European integration.
These findings hold for our secondmodel inwhichwe
include the interaction effect between groups’ European
policy interests and party positions towards European in-
tegration. When looking at Model 2, we notice that the
main coefficients of groups’ European policy interests
are no longer significant and that both main effects in-
cluded in the interaction substantially decreased in size.
However, both interaction coefficients are different from
zero (p < .01) which indicates that the two factors are in-
deed jointly affecting the likelihood of contact.
How do they do so? In order to gain a better un-
derstanding of the estimated effects of group interests
in, and party positions towards, the EU, we computed
the average marginal predicted probabilities of contact
for all possible combinations of parties’ EU positions,
and groups’ European policy interests. We plot these in
Figure 1. To ease interpretability, we do not display com-
binations with groups for whom European policy is less
important (our middle category).
As can be seen, the figure provides broad support for
our two hypotheses. To begin, in linewith H1, the steeply
rising dotted line illustrates that interest groups whose
policy interests are dealt with at the EU level are substan-
tially more likely to have contact with pro-European par-
ties than with parties that oppose European integration.
Next, the figure reveals that groups for whom EU policy
is an important or the most important focus become sig-
nificantly more likely to contact a given party when this
party is at least in favour of European integration, as com-
pared to interest groups for whom EU policy is not impor-
tant. When parties are neutral, or opposed to European
integration, the largely overlapping confidence intervals
indicate that there is no significant difference between
interest groups.
Last, even though the predicted probabilities of
contact between interest groups without substantive
European policy interests rise marginally the more pro-
European parties become, this increase is much smaller
than for EU-interested interest groups and is not sta-
tistically significant. This means that, in line with H2,
despite the fact that they are slightly more drawn
to pro-European parties, groups without substantive
European policy interests are not distinctly affected by
party positions concerning European integration. Overall,
the analyses lend broad support to our theoretical ar-
gument that interest groups whose long-term policy-
specific priorities are related to issues addressed in
the EU multi-level setting, avoid parties whose opposi-
tion to European integration crosscut their prime pol-
icy objectives.
Finally, considering the control variables, we note
that while not all the explanations are significantly dif-
ferent from zero, they all point in the expected direc-
tion. We find that contact between interest groups and
parties is more likely if European integration is a more



















strongly opposed neutral strongly in favor
Important/most important
Not important
IG interest in European policy
Party posion towards European integraon
Figure 1. Interaction between groups’ interest in EU public policy and parties’ position towards the EU. Notes: The fig-
ure shows average marginal predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals, based on Model 2. Groups for whom
European policy is less important are omitted from the graph to ease interpretation (full graph available from the authors).
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ate positions on the GAL–TAN dimension, if they are
larger in parliament, and if they are older. In contrast,
ideological positions on the left–right dimension, gov-
ernment participation, or being populist does not affect
the likelihood of contact. Perhaps these null findings are
due to some collinearity between these measures and
similar ones included in the model. However, it is also
conceivable that parties with more extreme economic
positions, for example, are simply less of a threat to
groups’maintenance goals than anticipated.With regard
to group-level variables, we find support for the asser-
tion that groups capable of delivering relevant policy in-
formation and interested in a wide range of topics, i.e.,
groupswithmore resources and a broader policy engage-
ment, are more likely to have contact with parties than
groups with fewer resources or narrower policy interests.
Less substantially important, but noteworthy nonethe-
less, there are differences between interest group types.
We also note an interesting division between Eastern and
Western European countries. Contact between interest
groups and parties is generally less likely in Lithuania and
Slovenia than in Belgium, the Netherlands, or Italy.
5. Conclusion
Our article contributes to a recent wave of studies on
the substantive change in the meaning of the dominant
cleavage in politics. These studies highlight that social-
cultural positions related to the EU often supersede the
‘classic’ socio-economic positions of parties. The issue
we sought to address is how much this shift has affected
interest group-party relations in five EU countries and,
more precisely, the extent to which parties’ stances to-
wards the EU determine whether interest groups have
contact with them.
Our principal conclusion has two aspects. First, we
find that ‘the big game is the party game.’ With this,
we do not imply that legislators provide interest groups
with their most important channel into politics (they,
at least, share that position with executive actors). We
mean that party-political conflict contaminates or even
dominates the narrow issue conflicts in which interest
groups are commonly involved. That is, if interest groups
are affected by EU policies, a party’s position towards
the EU is one the most critical cues governing the willing-
ness of interest groups to stay in contact, favouring pro-
EU parties. Importantly, we find this after controlling for
other factors, including the party’s alignment on other
critical issues such as socio-economic positions andother
cultural-social stances. Our second contribution is more
specific to the interest groups literature. We find that
interest group-party relations are heavily structured by
the policy instruments chosen. This is traditionally con-
ceived of in terms of the so-called Lowi-Wilson matrix of
the cost-benefit distributions of policies (Wilson, 1980).
However, in this case, it refers to the shape of the ‘pol-
icy terrain’ (e.g., Hacker & Pierson, 2014, pp. 645–648)
in terms of the particular distribution of policy compe-
tences between the EU and its members states. This
particular multi-level distribution of competences within
policy areas sets the contours of the political incen-
tives to coalesce, oppose, support, and coordinate with
other actors (for a similar assessment see Heinkelmann-
Wild, Kriegmair, & Rittberger, 2020); particularly given
the party-political politicisation of European integration
as an issue. Our study suggests that we need a more pre-
cise understanding of how these policy area-specific dy-
namics are connected to broader political oppositions in
the party system and beyond.
Our findings have several consequences. First, politi-
cal parties that voice Eurosceptic political positions may
represent particular sub-sections of the electorate but
they burn bridgeswithmany interest groupswhose inter-
ests are affected by EU public policy. This makes it more
difficult to take responsibility for substantive changes in
public policy bymeans of networks of contactswith inter-
est representatives. This potentially splits party systems
throughout Europe between parties who meaningfully
voice legitimate Eurosceptic positions, but who can or
do not take government responsibility, and political par-
ties who avoid the EU issue, or take pro-EU positions and
retain viability as responsible officeholders (this adds to
the incentives in the same direction noted by Lefkofridi,
2020). This contributes to what Mair (2009) identified as
the ‘bifurcation of party systems.’ Future studies could
assess whether such bifurcation actually occurs and how
it varies across countries.
Second, due to the multidimensionality of party con-
flict and the multi-level nature of decision-making in
Europe, it becomes increasingly difficult for interest
groups and parties to find natural allies and establish
long-term contacts among each other. One could ar-
gue that this is beneficial as it leads to more open, per-
haps more democratically legitimate, decision-making.
Nevertheless, there are also disadvantages, as it poten-
tially also leads to more opportunistic coalitions of par-
ties and interest groups focussed on short-term gains,
rather than long-term stability (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 4;
Olson, 1982). It could also result in the representation
of only those interests which manage to vertically and
horizontally venue-shop along favourably deposed polit-
ical environments. Future studies may assess such impli-
cations for political outcomes.
This bring us to our third consideration: It is not yet
clearwho are thewinners and losers in the interest group
community due to the changes outlined above. Does this
enable more opportunities for wealthy, business-like or-
ganisations, or do other types of interests gainmore? For
instance, one could argue that business groups lose if EU
scepticism trumps economic reasoning in policymaking.
Brexit, which has been fiercely opposed by the major-
ity of the businesses in the United Kingdom, is perhaps
the most apparent example. Yet, on other issues, it may
also increase opportunities for the business community
as the debates about the distributional consequences
of policies are deprioritised in favour of political debate
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concerning socio-cultural issues. For instance, important
competing firms can easily free ride on NGO opposition
to trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership. Future studies should therefore
seek to explain how party relations affect policy output,
thereby assessing the primary winners and losers of po-
litical conflict.
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